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1. INTRODUCTION
Mr Jason Kravitt, one of the leading experts in securitization in 
the world, argued that ‘There is something about the practice of 
securitization that engenders intense emotions. One either loves 
securitization or hates it.’1 This bold remark was made when the 
full extent of the 2007–2008 financial crisis was not yet known. 
Made today, it would be even bolder, for the number of securiti-
zation haters has soared, and the number of securitization lovers 
has dwindled with every development unveiling new cases of 
incompetence and plain greed.
Thus, asking whether all securitization bashing is justified 
would be a provocative question. True enough, the use made of 
this mechanism by bankers was all the more reckless. It fuelled a 
debt expansion and housing bubble that, when bursting, created 
the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Worst still, 
securitization decisively contributed to turn a real estate collapse 
into a money market freeze, crippling the economies’ ability to 
borrow their way out.
Yet well-employed securitization can be an extremely useful 
mechanism to manage liquidity shortages (particularly in finan-
cial firms). Furthermore, securitization was only the trigger in a 
Russian roulette game played with a fully loaded gun, as the root 
causes of the current crisis were in the global trade and financial 
imbalances, which particularly affected the US economy. Likewise, 
the crisis’ disastrous effects will likely serve as a warning light for 
the future, as prior crises served to bring junk bonds and other 
financial instruments to normality.
Finally, securitization’s excesses were partly due to its being a 
technique under inadequate regulation. Criticism against Basel I and 
Basel II Frameworks on Banking Capital,2 particularly on the secu-
ritization provisions are now commonplace and experts are placing 
much of the weight of the blame on this set of rules.
Yet while we accept the premise that securitization was 
improperly regulated; and that the Basel Framework suffered 
some deficiencies, we do not accept that securitization issues 
are limited to that. We contend that one of securitization’s main 
problems is that, despite its economic importance, it lived largely 
on the edges of the regulatory web. Widely employed, yet barely 
understood by bankers, lawyers or regulators, ‘securitization’ is 
a victim of its own success, with its widespread use hindering its 
ability to define with precision a specific transaction type. That 
was the problem encountered by regulators, who often opted for 
piecemeal regulation to solve concrete problems, which pushed 
securitization even more to the shade; instead of reaching for a 
comprehensive approach, which could have brought structured 
finance to the (much needed) limelight.
In the present study we will make a brief introduction to secu-
ritization, its specific varieties, and its role in the context of the 
2007–2008 financial crisis (2). Next, we analyse the difficulty of 
defining securitization and special purpose vehicles(SPVs) from 
the perspective of general financial rules, and finding a common 
concept in specific regulations (3). We will then outline the impli-
cations this has for supervision (4), to finally gather some general 
conclusions (5).
2.  SECURITIZATION: DESCRIPTION, TYPES, AND ROLE 
IN THE 2007–2008 CRISIS. PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS 
ON REGULATION
2.1. The Standard Securitization Transaction
Securitization, or structured finance, is a complex process sur-
rounded by an even more complex vocabulary, and deliberately 
involved in an aura of mystery. In order to separate intrinsic from 
intentional intricacies, we will describe a basic securitization 
transaction. It works as follows.
1 Kravitt, Jason, Foreword: Some Thoughts on What Has Happened to the Capital Markets and Securitization and Where Securitization is Going Draft, 7 Aug. 2008, 5. Available at 
<www.pli.edu/public/17984/foreword.pdf>.
2 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision ‘International Convergence Of Capital Measurement And Capital Standards’. Basel. July 1988 (Basel I); and ‘International Conver-
gence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards. A Revised Framework. Comprehensive Version’ June 2006 (Basel II).
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This securitization transaction begins with the ‘originator’ or 
‘sponsor’, a large corporation (usually a financial undertaking) in 
need of liquidity. In order to do that, the firm must sell the assets 
in the market, exchanging them for cash. Those assets (generally 
receivables arising from credit arrangements) differ widely in 
payment terms, maturity, etc., hence the need to ‘repackage’ them 
in a pool that makes regular payments at the end of each stipu-
lated period.
In addition, the assets need not only be repackaged, but also 
separated and isolated from the originator/sponsor; so that 
a potential investor is not exposed to the risk inherent to the 
originator’s global activity (complex and difficult to evaluate) but 
to the risk inherent to the underlying loans (supposedly easier to 
estimate with statistical models).
The best way to do that is to resort to a so-called SPV. The 
SPV, a corporation, partnership, or trust, acquires the receivables 
from the originator, and sells securities to investor. The securities’ 
periodical payments will rely on the flows from the  underlying 
assets that have been securitized. The SPV thus  isolates the 
underlying assets from the originator, and channels the offering 
to investors, and investors’ cash towards the  originator.
In order to ensure that the transaction runs smoothly, how-
ever, it will be necessary that someone continues to collect the 
cash from the debtors of the underlying receivables, and provide 
the necessary cash if there is a temporary or permanent shortage 
of funds to satisfy investors’ payments. This task will be per-
formed by the servicer, which often will be the originator itself.
Once the transaction ‘architecture’ is in place, it will be 
 necessary to place the securities among investors willing to 
purchase them. This will be a task for the underwriters, who are 
 well-acquainted with the intricacies of capital markets and securi-
ties offerings.
Finally, in order for the offering to gain acceptance among 
investors, they must be provided with a measure of the level of 
risk involved in the securities. In this sense, an adequate rating by 
a rating agency will be the basis for investors to assess the sound-
ness of the transaction structure, the securities’ creditworthiness, 
and the overall probability of default.
2.2. Specifi c Securitization Varieties
Classifications of securitization deals can be numerous, depend-
ing on the distinctive factor chosen to identify the transaction. 
For example, depending on the arrangement for payment to 
investors, and the type of SPV chosen, the deal can be a pass-
through (where the SPV passes payments to the investors, on the 
same periods, and with the same fluctuations, as in the actual 
receivables) or a pay-through one (where payments are made on 
the stipulated dates regardless of the cash flows from the collec-
tion dates and defaults of the underlying assets).
An important distinction that must be made is that between 
‘static’ and ‘dynamic’ transactions. In a static transaction, an asset 
pool is isolated, and that asset pool will be backing the pay-
ments to investors, and thus held till maturity. Yet this rigidity in 
the selection of the assets may be too risky for investors to bear 
(together with the possibility of default by underlying debtors, 
there is also the risk of anticipated cancellation of the underlying 
loans, in which case the cash would lose utility for periodical pay-
ments). Furthermore, the dates of payment and maturity of the 
assets may diverge, causing potential disruption. For those rea-
sons, it is not uncommon to find structures with some stipulated 
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degree of substitution of the underlying assets in cases of default, 
anticipated cancellation, maturity, etc. These could be defined as 
‘revolving’ structures.
One step further, however, would be those structures where 
they are substituted not just on the basis of restricted causes, 
like those outlined above, but also in cases where a better offer is 
found in the market, giving rise to an active management of the 
pool. This would be a feature more frequent in those cases where 
the underlying assets are themselves securities (thereby allow-
ing, by their more standardized nature, an adequate process of 
 valuation), as in a securitization of corporate bonds, or asset-
backed securities. This second case is known as ‘re-securitization’, 
or ‘securitization of securitized assets’.
Another securitization type of relevance for this study is the 
so-called ‘synthetic securitization’, characterized by the use of 
derivative contracts. It is important to note from the outset that 
a securitization transaction may use derivative contracts with-
out becoming a ‘synthetic securitization’. That is the case when 
those derivatives are employed to hedge investors against interest 
rate or currency risk. In those cases, the hedging agreement is 
an ancillary one. As opposed to that, in synthetic securitization 
the derivative contract lies at the core of the transaction, for it is 
employed to transfer the main risk involved in it: the risk associ-
ated with the underlying assets themselves.
This requires a type of agreement more modern than inter-
est rate or currency contract: the so-called ‘credit derivative’. 
Credit derivatives (Credit Default Swaps, or CDSs being the most 
popular)3 are contracts that protect the creditor against the risk 
that its debtor will default. In the securitization context, they 
are employed as a substitute mechanism to the pure assign-
ment of receivables used in the ‘traditional’ or ‘plain vanilla’ 
 securitization.
Synthetic securitization in its most basic version requires a 
minimum of two derivatives contracts: one between the origina-
tor/sponsor and the SPV, another between the SPV and investors. 
The second contract will supposedly mirror the first. Under those 
contracts, investors will make a payment of a principal amount in 
cash to the SPV, which will hold it for the benefit of the origina-
tor/sponsor.4 In exchange, the originator/sponsor makes peri-
odical payments; which, channelled through the SPV, are finally 
transferred to investors. When a credit event (e.g., a default of a 
certain size in the pool) occurs, the SPV, will draw on the depos-
ited cash, and make it available to the originator. In exchange, 
the originator will transfer the SPV, the defaulted assets, or a cash 
equivalent (physical or cash settlement). Despite its minimum 
version only requiring two contracts, it is common to divide the 
transaction in tranches, according to the risk involved, which 
would require as many separate contracts as tranches.
3 Credit derivative agreements are varied, but they usually imply a combination of CDS, credit spread swaps (CSS), or credit linked notes (CLN). Bell, Ian & Dawson, Petrina, 
‘Synthetic Securitization: Use of Derivative Technology for Credit Transfer’, Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 12 (2002): 551.
4 Ibid., 560.
Source: Ian Bell & Petrina Dawson, ‘Synthetic Securitization: Use of Derivative Technology for Credit Transfer’, Duke Journal of 
 Comparative and International Law 12 (2002): 561.
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2.3. Securitization and the 2007–2008 Financial Crisis
Once the different types of securitization have been identified, it 
is necessary to say a word or two about the reason that securitiza-
tion has recently been the subject of attention by the mass media: 
the 2007–2008 financial crisis. In this sense, it will be useful to 
separate the role of securitization, which acted both as trigger 
and novel element of this crisis, from the role of purely economic 
forces involved in creating the conditions for its development.
At the very heart of the crisis were the global imbalances in 
trade and finance generated from 2000 onwards. A growing trade 
deficit in the United States made this country more dependent 
on debt. Under normal circumstances, this should have led, on 
the one hand, to an increase of interest rates, a slowdown of 
economic growth, and the curbing of consumption; and, on the 
other hand, to a currency rise in the economies with trade supera-
vit, equivalent to the fall in the dollar, things that, all together, 
should have reined on the trade deficit.
Instead, the exchange rates did not fulfil their stabilizing 
role. China’s active policy to keep the Yuan low could be blamed, 
on the one hand. Yet at the core of the problem was the rise in 
demand for dollar-denominated assets around the world. This 
demand came, on one side, from oil-rich countries, which, due 
to the rise in oil prices, had plenty of cash to invest. On the other 
hand, it came from Asian countries, which, after their own finan-
cial crises in the 1990s (caused in part by those States’ inability to 
keep their exchange rate), were focused on building up reserves of 
foreign currency (so that, in case their currency depreciated, they 
could prop up its value by selling their reserves, and purchasing 
assets denominated in that currency). As can be imagined, the 
preferred currency in their war chest was the dollar.
Under normal circumstances, the increase in demand (i.e., the 
existing demand by US investors plus the one from foreign inves-
tors) for investment-grade American assets (generally of AAA or 
similar rating) should have increased their price, leading to a new 
equilibrium with supply. Yet in this case, the increase in demand 
led to… an increase in supply of AAA assets. And here is where 
securitization came to the stage and the problems began.
Securitization had so far been a mechanism for financial and 
other firms to enhance liquidity. Yet the increased demand of 
AAA assets created an opportunity to profit from that, and firms 
(mostly banks) began a massive vicious circle where they repack-
aged their credit assets and sold participations in them to inves-
tors, while using the cash obtained to generate new assets that 
would be securitized again. From the traditional ‘originate-to-
hold’ banking model, the ‘originate-to-distribute’ model evolved.
The problem is that incentives are clearly upset from the first 
to the second model. A bank has a stronger incentive to closely 
monitor its borrowers when it is holding the loans (thereby 
bearing the risk of default) than in cases where these loans will 
be ultimately held by someone else. Thus, in the US a process 
was operated where traditional methods of client scrutiny were 
progressively substituted by an over-reliance in the clients’ 
credit score.5
This lower level of scrutiny (and the lower level of documenta-
tion it entailed) might have been detected upon a close examina-
tion by sophisticated investors. Alas, this examination suffered too 
from an over-reliance on numerical indicators. Because if banks 
heavily trusted FICO scores, investors’ reliance on the ratings pro-
vided by agencies like Moody’s and Standard & Poors was closer 
to blind faith. This was reckless at least on two counts. First, 
because rating agencies were evaluating products whose risks 
were barely understood, let alone properly appraised.6 Second, 
because those ratings were supposed to measure only a security’s 
risk of default, without any consideration to other factors, like 
liquidity risk (i.e., the risk that an investor willing to sell some of 
those securities in the market does not find a purchaser).7
The problem was aggravated because asset-backed securities 
were repackaged again and again (re-securitization) giving rise to 
overly complex products that nobody could understand or value 
properly.8 And, just to add more to the mess, originators and 
sponsors of securitization transactions retained a great amount 
of risk in their assets despite having securitized them; a risk that 
had been unduly placed off-balance sheet.9 The bottom line is 
that nobody knew how much risk there was, and where was that 
risk concentrated, and so when the housing bubble burst in 2007, 
and borrowers began to default, inter-bank markets froze, since 
nobody wanted to lend to anybody. This systemic freeze led to the 
collapse of one entity after the other to the present day.
5 In the US companies like Fair Isaac elaborate clients’ credit score according to their history of meeting payments, coming up with the so-called ‘FICO score’. FICO scores have 
been one of the important measures to evaluate a client’s creditworthiness. Traditionally, however, banks run their own tests to double-check whether the assessment made by 
the FICO scores was adequate, often requiring their potential clients to provide extensive documentation. According to some economic studies, securitization greatly altered 
this dynamic. Under an ‘originate-to-distribute’ model what matters for the bank is not so much whether a client is creditworthy, but whether his FICO score makes the loan 
eligible for being securitized. Therefore, banks began to cut short their scrutiny process in favour of the numerical rating. The results were striking, for mortgage credits slightly 
above the threshold that made them eligible for securitization showed higher rates of default than those slightly below that threshold, despite corresponding supposedly to more 
creditworthy debtors. See Benjamin J. Keys, et al., ‘Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans 2001–2006’, January (2008), 8–13 and 18–19.
6 In mid-October 2008 some correspondence between two analysts from rating agencies was exposed. In the recollection made by The Economist, one analyst said ‘That deal 
is ridiculous. We should not be rating it’. His correspondent replied: ‘We rate every deal... it could be structured by cows and we would rate it’. ‘Credit-Rating Agencies. Negative 
Outlook’, The Economist, 15 Nov. 1981.
7 See The Economist, ‘Black Mark. An Accounting Standard Comes under the Microscope’, Paradise Lost. A Special Report on International Banking. The Economist, 17 May 2008, 14.
8 ‘CDOs (securitisations of securitisations, which are instruments based on pools of mortgage-backed securities) [...] caused big problems because they were very opaque and particu-
larly susceptible to correlations and liquidity risk’. The Economist ‘Ruptured credit. Securitisation has its fl aws, but many of them can be mitigated’, in Paradise Lost. A special 
report on international banking. 10.
9 Citigroup, e.g., announced in repurchased between 2007 and 2008, all the assets from its off-balance sheet Structured Investment Vehicles, in order to protect its reputation. 
The risk of this purchase (and the consequent assumption of risks) was clearly not refl ected in the balance sheet. See The Economist ‘Ruptured credit. Securitisation has its 
fl aws, but many of them can be mitigated’, in Paradise Lost. A special report on international banking. 6.
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In conclusion, the financial crisis had its origin in typical eco-
nomic imbalances. Securitization was the means by which those 
imbalances were channelled into the flooding of financial markets 
with bad debt. And safeguard mechanisms, either in the market 
(e.g., FICO scores or rating agencies) or in regulatory provisions 
(e.g., banking regulation) failed to put a check on these excesses.
2.4.  Securitization as a Transaction in the Shade and the Need 
for Specifi c Supervision
No sooner had the collapse occurred that the quest to assign 
the blame began. On the regulatory side, the righteous wrath of 
policy experts and opinion makers fell on the Basel Framework 
for Capital Measurement. This set of banking regulations lacked 
adequate rules for disclosure of off-balance sheet transactions, 
and suffered from an over-reliance on agencies’ credit ratings. As 
a result, banks following these rules did neither properly reflect 
nor adequately appraise the risks in their balance sheets.
While we may agree on this extensively debated regulatory 
blunder, we want to focus on a not-so-much discussed aspect: 
the specific regulation of securitization transactions and SPVs. 
Yet in previous lines we acknowledged that securitization is quite 
a clockwork transaction, and SPVs a mostly passive device, then, 
why the need to discuss regulation? We find at least three reasons 
why this may be a useful exercise. 
First, there are occasions, as in synthetic or dynamic transac-
tions, where securitization and the SPV may not be characterized 
by such automatism, hence the usefulness to address regulatory 
problems in an adequate framework. Second, securitization has 
been a transaction mostly developed in the shade of fi nan-
cial markets, with fi nancial regulations following a piecemeal 
approach that has covered only specifi c aspects of it. Thus, a 
comprehensive set of rules could contribute to some standardiza-
tion, enhancing predictability. This coupled with general licensing 
requirements could improve transparency, and boost liquidity. In 
third place, a discussion of specifi c securitization – SPV regulation 
could unveil defi ciencies in the regulatory and supervision system 
as a whole. Therefore, even if we conclude that no specifi c regula-
tion is necessary, we consider that the discussion per se is useful, 
necessary; and, given the present state of affairs, peremptory.
3.  PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AND CHARACTERIZATION PROBLEMS 
DO WE REALLY KNOW WHAT SECURITIZATION IS?
It is a common assumption that the ability to provide fi nancial 
services must be made subject to license by a competent  authority. 
Only by means of a licensing process can a State ensure that 
prudential regulation is abided by, and thus investors’ interests are 
protected. Yet the trouble with securitization is that, despite having 
a potentially substantial impact on those interests, and fi nancial 
markets at large, it does not sit comfortably with traditional cate-
gories of fi nancial activity. Thus, as surprising as it may seem, such 
an important fi nancial activity as securitization has gone largely 
unlicensed. Furthermore, even specifi c regulations covering ‘secu-
ritization’ and ‘SPVs’ differ as to what is meant by those terms.
3.1.  Prudential Regulation, Access to Activity, and the Slippery 
 Notion of Securitization
3.1.1. Securitization and SPVs as Credit Institutions
At first sight, any comparison between a solid and hulky credit 
institution, and a thin securitization vehicle would seem 
 ridiculous. Yet if we make abstraction of the actual entities, 
and think about the activity performed by securitization SPVs, 
we could be amazed about its similarity to that undertaken by 
banks. Indeed, a securitization SPV takes money from the public 
(investors in the public offering) and transfers it to the originator. 
Then, if we skip the fact that, formally, the underlying assets from 
which investors are paid have been transferred to the SPV, we 
have that every time a payment is due, the originator collects the 
money (for it usually retains the servicing role) and pays it to the 
SPV (the SPV, in turn, transfers it to investors). Now, is that not 
something strikingly similar to what a bank does?
Indeed, this impression, made in a legal vacuum is confirmed 
by regulatory provisions on this matter. The notion of a ‘credit 
institution’ under European Community law, encompasses every 
‘undertaking whose business is to receive deposits or other repayable 
funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account’.10 
This includes the activity of factoring,11 which closely resembles 
securitization, except for the obvious fact that one is performed 
by a bank and the other by an SPV. Were the SPV to be regarded 
as a bank, and the problem would be solved. Such was the argu-
ment put forward by some national regulators, who insisted on 
the need to treat SPVs as regular financial intermediaries.12
To counter that, it has been argued that the active role of the 
bank in a factoring transaction, with its servicing, administra-
tion and management, cannot be compared to the passive role 
of the SPV in a securitization.13 Either for this reason, or just to 
plainly avoid unexpected trouble, the European regulator excludes 
SPVs/ Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) from the notion of ‘credit 
 institution’.14 Seemingly, some national regulators expressly exclude 
SPVs from registration, but only as long as activities like loan 
10 See Art. 4(1) of the Directive 2006/48/EC.
11 Annex I (List of Activities subject to Mutual Recognition) of the Directive includes within the defi nition of ‘Lending’ the factoring transaction, where the originator sells its 
receivables to a bank at a discount.
12 The Banca d’Italia (BdI), on the basis of Ministerial Decree of 6 Jul. 1994, which included factoring among fi nancial transactions subject to regulation, argued that SPVs should 
be considered as regular fi nancial intermediaries. The Banca d’Italia expressed this view through a resolution (circolare). See Impresa, 1999, 1401.
13 Danillo Galletti, ‘Articolo 4’, in Danillo Galletti, Gianluca Guerrieri, Andrea Carinci, Legge 30 Aprile 1999, N. 130 Disposizioni sulla Cartolarizzazione dei Crediti, 1064–1065.
14 Article 4 (Defi nitions) of the 2006/48/EC Directive provides, in its no. 44, that ‘“securitisation special purpose entity (SSPE)” means a corporation trust or other entity, other than 
a credit institution, organised for carrying on a securitisation…’.
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 servicing have been outsourced to third  parties with a license.15 
Yet while the outcome is clear, it cannot be said to be convincing.
3.1.2. SPVs as Insurance Undertakings
The initial contrast with SPVs is even more pronounced when 
insurance companies are involved. Not only the very connotation 
of mighty and deep-pocketed entities is at odds with what an SPV 
is. The insurance activity would be at odds with securitization… 
at first glance. If we avoid thinking about traditional categories of 
insurance (life, health, cars…) we immediately see that one very 
popular branch of the insurance business has lately been credit 
risk insurance.
Yes, we could counter; but there is no insurance contract 
where the insured transfers to the insurance company the receiv-
ables subject to the credit risk; and that is exactly what occurs in 
securitization. That, provided we focus on ‘traditional’ securi-
tization. As seen earlier, financial practice offers the possibility 
of ‘synthetic’ securitization, where originator and SPV; and SPV 
and investors, enter into credit derivative agreements (typically 
CDS).16 Under such agreements, a principal amount in cash is 
paid by investors and deposited by the SPV in a bank account, 
while the originator makes periodical payments; and, if a default 
occurs, it draws from the deposit. Could that not be assimilated to 
the insurance activity? Just make the periodical payments be the 
premium, and the amount drawn be the compensation, and the 
securitization SPV could go as an insurance company.
The distinction between insurance and credit derivative 
contracts has already been the subject of thoughtful discussion. 
It has been argued that insurance contracts are characterized by 
a remedial nature, whereas that purpose is absent from deriva-
tive contracts.17 Nevertheless, while this distinction may be true, 
it may also be all too subtle, and lost in the complexities of each 
specific deal, where a contract type conceived formally for one 
purpose is used for another. In this respect, what should matter 
for the purposes of regulation should not only be the nature of 
the contract, from a legal perspective; but the nature of the activ-
ity, from a business standpoint.
Indeed, we can take the example of French securitization 
rules, which are one of the few that expressly regulate synthetic 
securitization. Those rules contemplate the possibility for the 
SPV to transfer the risk associated to the assets by means of both 
financial contracts and insurance contracts,18 without entering 
into the distinctions and subtleties outlined by legal scholarship. 
From a more simplistic perspective, the 2007–2008 financial crisis 
offered sufficient examples of the intermingling of both activi-
ties, in the form of insurance companies gone bust for getting too 
deeper into securitization activities (AIG, an insurance behemoth 
being the most notorious example). Subtle distinctions did not 
seem to matter much when profit was available.
3.1.3. SPVs, Investment Firms and Collective Investment Undertakings
Securitization SPVs must also stand the test of other categories, 
like that of investment firms, and collective investment under-
takings. As to the former, the obvious difficulty comes from the 
fact that there has not been much effort to isolate a notion of 
 ‘investment firm’. European rules, for example, refer to firms pro-
viding investment services or performing investment activities;19 
but beyond that broad reference, an investment firm will very 
much be anything the law says an investment firm is, whatsoever. 
And it could not have been otherwise; for the number of potential 
activities that can be undertaken in financial markets is legion, 
and subject to a thriving and ever-changing practice.
Thus, it would be reasonable to assume that an investment 
firm will be an entity undertaking an activity in financial markets 
that is relevant enough for investors’ interests and market stability 
as a whole as to attract regulatory attention. Yet if that is the cur-
rent position, we should question why securitization SPVs are left 
out of that category.20 The reason could well be that the relation-
ship ‘firm-client’, implied in the scheme of financial regulation,21 
is absent in the securitization scenario, for the very notion of 
‘client’ is substituted by that of ‘investor’. Still, it is undeniable 
that SPVs act as intermediaries between the originating com-
panies and investors. And, as to the relevance of their activity, 
the 2007–2008 financial crisis should provide us with sufficient 
evidence of it. Thus, we find no reasonable argument to exempt 
SPVs from the status of investment firms.
As to the consideration of SPVs as collective investment 
undertakings, the comparison is even less unavoidable. Both are 
vehicles formed by an underlying asset pool that sells its participa-
tions among investors, who have no say in the investment policy 
of the pool. Of course, some differences persist: underlying assets 
are receivables in one case, and securities in the other; SPVs are 
generally passive, whereas collective investment undertakings are 
actively managed; SPVs act as a vehicle for the originator, whereas 
15 In the Netherlands, the SPV will be exempt from registration if it has outsourced the servicing of the loan receivables and the administration thereof to an entity holding a 
license under the Financial Services Act. See van ‘t Westeinde, Mariëtte ‘Chapter 36. Netherlands’, in The International Comparative Legal Guide to: Securitization 2007 (Global 
Legal Group, 2007), 287.
16 To subscribe the contract, the SPV agrees with the trustee acting in representation of the investors’ interests. Ian Bell & Petrina Dawson, ‘Synthetic Securitization: Use of 
Derivative Technology for Credit Transfer’, Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 12 (2002): 559.
17 David Benton, Patrick Devine & Philip Jarvis, ‘Credit Derivatives Are Not Insurance Products’, International Financial Law Review 16 (1997): 29; José Manuel Cuenca Miranda, 
‘Los Derivados de Crédito: El Contrato de Credit Default Swap’, Revista de Derecho Bancario y Bursátil 78 (2000): 23; Philip R. Wood, Regulation of International Finance 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2007), para. 11-074, 318–319.
18 See Arts L214-49-1 (fi nancial contracts) and L214-49-11 et seq. (insurance contracts) of the French Financial and Monetary Code.
19 See Recital (7) of the 2004/39/EC MiFiD Directive.
20 Annex I A of the 2004/39/EC MiFiD Directive makes a list of ‘Investment services and activities’, and does not include any activity resembling what a securitization SPV does.
21 Article 4(1)(1) of the MiFiD Directive provides that: ‘“Client” means any natural or legal person to whom an investment fi rm provides investment and/or ancillary services’.
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management companies act for the benefi t of investors; they 
spread risk,22 while SPVs concentrate it (by acquiring assets from 
a single originator). Yet those differences could be blurred depend-
ing on the type of securitization (and collective investment): 
re-securitization transactions involve asset-backed securities (not 
receivables) as underlying assets; some dynamic securitization 
structures may imply the substitution of the underlying assets, 
and even the active management of the portfolio, including the 
purchase of assets from multiple originators; unit trust managers 
will act in the best interest of the bank or investment fi rm acting 
as a sponsor of the unit trust, while it would not be hard to derive 
a duty on the side of SPV managers to care for investors’ interests.
This impression is confirmed by examining some of the regu-
lations in the matter. European Directives, for example, require 
that the investment pool of assets be formed by ‘eligible invest-
ments’, which must generally be securities.23 This would in prin-
ciple rule out securitization schemes other than re- securitization 
(where underlying assets are themselves asset-backed securi-
ties). Yet the scope of eligible investments has been expanded to 
include ‘bonds and other forms of securitized debt’.24 This would 
also include securitization transactions over corporate bonds, 
but would leave out mortgage or credit card securitization, which 
have traditionally accounted for the bulk of the industry.
From the perspective of management, thus, collective invest-
ment differs from securitization in that it targets the public at large, 
including unsophisticated investors, who need to be protected from 
exotic bets, or untested and risky products; hence the requirements 
of risk spread and reliable eligible investments. Yet those differences 
blur as soon as receivables from a single originator, packaged and 
offered as securities, are repackaged with those from other origina-
tors, and used to back new asset-backed securities. As such, there 
would be a two-step process; with a fi rst securitization, different 
in kind to collective investment; and a second (re-)securitization, 
where the asset pool and its management should be regulated 
under the rules for collective investment undertakings.
Indeed, it could be argued that the two-step process is too sub-
tle a distinction; and could create too wide a loophole; and thus 
all SPVs alike should be regulated as UCITS. This has clearly been 
the view of the French regulator. Under French law, securitization 
and SPVs form part of the wider spectrum of collective invest-
ment.25 Seemingly, the regulatory model adopted by Spanish law 
(with a securitization fund and a management company) suggests 
that the model followed is that of collective investment.26 The 
problem of this approach is that, for cases of purely ‘passive’ secu-
ritization the appointment of a management company constitutes 
an unnecessary and redundant step. Still, it could be countered, 
better safe than sorry.
Other countries have adopted the opposite approach, by 
expressly exempting SPVs from license and registration require-
ments. The clearest case is that of the United States,27 where 
collective investment is regulated under the 1940 Investment 
Company Act. US regulators have created an exemption from 
registration for Issuers of Asset-Backed Securities provided the 
payments made by those securities depend on the payment from 
the underlying assets; and the securities have been rated in one of 
the four highest categories by at least one Nationally Recognized 
Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO), that is rating agency; or 
otherwise sold to qualified investors.28 Yet express exclusions do 
leave open the debate on the nature of the SPVs’ activity, the dif-
ferences in substance with collective investment, and the absence 
of a need for license requirements.
3.2. Specifi c Regulations and the Resilient Absence of Uniformity
3.2.1.  Securitization Regulations, Securitization Defi nition and Its Troubles
It is not surprising that, given the troubled relationship between 
securitization and SPVs on one side, and traditional categories 
of (regulated) financial activity, on the other, some States have 
opted for a middle-of-the-road solution, like enacting specific 
securitization rules. Those participate in the general principles of 
financial regulation, but resist any categorization. Some examples 
are Italy,29 Spain,30 United States,31 India32 or Portugal33 (under 
French law securitization is a mode of collective investment; but 
could well be included in this group, for securitization is provided 
with a specific regime).34
22 Article 1(2) of Directive 85/661/EEC provides that: ‘For the purposes of this Directive, and subject to Article 2, UCITS shall be undertakings: the sole object of which is the collective 
investment in transferable securities of capital raised from the public and which operate on the principle of risk-spreading’.
23 See Art. 1(2) of Directive 85/661/EEC supra.
24 See new Art. 1(8) of Directive 85/661/EC, as amended by Directive 2001/108/EC with regard to investments of UCITS.
25 The Law 88-1201, which regulated securitization funds (fons communs de creances) in the context of collective investment undertakings. After being incorporated into the 
French Financial and Monetary Code, the fons communs de titrisation (trust SPVs) are regulated under S. 2 (Les organismes de titrisation) of Ch. IV (Placements collectifs) of 
Title 1 (Les instruments fi nanciers) of Book II (Les produits), whereas s. 1 regulates ‘traditional’ collective investment undertakings, and includes general provisions common 
for all entities.
26 The 19/1992 Act, as well as the 926/1998 Royal Decree contemplate a model with a trust-like fund formed by the underlying assets, and a management company, as in unit trusts.
27 That would also be the case in Austria, where ‘securitization companies’ (Verbriefungs-spezialgesellschaften) are expressly exempt from registration requirements, since it is not 
considered that they undertake any banking activity (Bankgeschäft). See Tibor Varga & Felix Hörlsberger, ‘Chapter 7. Austria’ The International Comparative Legal Guide to: 
Securitization 2007 (Global Legal Group, 2007), 43.
28 See Rule 3 (a) (7). The rule does not exclude the so-called Principal-Only (PO) or Interest-Only (IO) securities, which give their holder the right to receive the residual interest 
in the asset pool. That despite the original position by the SEC, that ordinary investors might not appreciate the risks involved, See Gerard Uzzi, ‘A Conceptual Framework for 
Imposing Statutory Underwriter Duties on Rating Agencies Involved in the Structuring of Private Label Mortgage-Backed Securities’, St. Johns Law Review 70 (1996): 788.
29 See 130/1999 Securitization Act.
30 See 19/1992 Act, and 926/1998 Royal Decree.
31 See AB Regulation.
32 See the 2002 Securitization and Reconstruction Act.
33 See Decree-Law 453/1999.
34 See Arts L 214-42-1 to L214-49-13 of the French Financial and Monetary Code.
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One could expect that specific securitization rules would 
increase certainty and predictability as to the nature and sub-
stance of the activity itself and that is the case, if we limit our 
analysis to a domestic level. If we engage, however, in a com-
parative exercise, we will conclude that, in addition to not being 
clearly included in any of the existing categories of financial 
activity, securitization does neither entail a uniform concept, nor 
encompasses a defined set of activities.
Take, for example, the distinction between static and dynamic 
securitization. Under the fi rst, there is a single and identifi ed 
pool of assets backing the securities issued. Under the second, the 
pool assets will rotate, either because they are substituted when 
reaching maturity, or even because there is an active management 
of the pool. Such dynamic structures are considered to fall within 
the defi nition of ‘securitization’ envisaged in the regulations 
under Spanish, French, or Italian law,35 or European rules on 
prospectus information.36 Yet despite the majority of regulations 
being inclined to encompass revolving (or even actively managed) 
transactions within their reach, American law, on the other hand, 
excludes them from the scope of securitization regulations. It does 
so under the premise that, in dynamic transactions, the securities 
issued are not ‘asset-backed’, for the assets are not identifi ed.37
We must clarify that American AB Regulation is not focused 
in the structure of the deal, but merely on information disclosure 
aspects. Therefore, by restricting themselves to passive transac-
tions, the rules do not pretend to outlaw dynamic securitization. 
Rather, they merely state that the forms to be filled by the spon-
sors will not be those specific for asset-backed securities.
A seeming division of views exists with regard to synthetic 
securitization structures, that is transactions that use deriva-
tive technology for the purposes of risk transfer. In this regard, 
it is the ‘positive’ view (i.e., the view encompassing the structure 
within the definition of securitization) that is in the minority. 
American AB Regulation expressly excludes synthetic securitiza-
tion from its scope.38 Spanish, Italian or Portuguese laws are 
designed having ‘traditional’ securitization (i.e., assignment of 
receivables) in mind.39 In that context, concluding on the use of 
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, necessary to accomplish this 
transaction, would probably stretch the language of the rules to 
the limits of the permissible.
The exception remains France. Its rules on securitization 
expressly contemplate the possibility of using derivatives not 
just for exchange or interest rate risk, but for transferring the 
underlying assets’ risk (i.e., credit risk).40 The requirements to 
accomplish a synthetic securitization are threefold: the risks 
must be included in the by-laws of the vehicle, together with an 
investment strategy;41 the total net loss cannot be higher than the 
total assets held by the SPV;42 and (in case of repos and insurance 
contracts) the agreement must be concluded with a credit institu-
tion or insurance company licensed in accordance with the laws 
of France, an EU, or  Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) country.43
A third aspect where the views may differ is on whether a secu-
ritization SPV is allowed to undertake any activities other than the 
core formalities necessary to securitize the assets (i.e., receive the 
assets from the originator, transfer the money to him, and offer 
and sell the securities). A reading of US AB Regulation would lead 
us to conclude that the SPV will only undertake a passive role, 
with no involvement in matters like the servicing of the assets.44
European countries somehow following the pattern of col-
lective investment when regulating securitization, split the roles 
between the actual vehicle formed by the asset pool (passive) and 
the management company. The latter performs a more active role, 
not just in the administration of the pool, but also in the manage-
ment of cash payments, where the depositor must often act at the 
behest of the management company.45
Still, those countries stop short of assigning purely ‘servic-
ing’ functions, like receivables collection, to either the vehicle or 
the management company. Some leave this matter to the parties’ 
 agreements;46 others imply that the originator will keep  performing 
35 See Art. 4(1) of Spanish Royal Decree 926/1998, Art. 214-49-5 para. 1 of French Financial and Monetary Code; or Art. 1(1) of Italian Law 130/1999.
36 See para. 2.3. of the Annex VIII (Minimum Disclosure Requirements) of the European Commission Regulation No. 809/2004 of 29 Apr. 2004 implementing Directive 2003/71/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards information contained in prospectuses as well as the format, incorporation by reference and publication of such 
prospectuses and dissemination of advertisements, which refers to the information to be included ‘In respect of an actively managed pool of assets backing the issue’.
37 See SEC, AB Regulation. Final Rule Request for Comment, 32. ‘In addition, the lack of a “discrete” requirement would make it diffi cult for an investor to make an informed investment 
decision when the composition of the pool is unknown or could change over time’.
38 See SEC, AB Regulation. Final Rule Request for Comment, 35.
39 References to the ‘receivables’, and their assignment can be found in Art. 2(1)(a) and (b) of Spanish Royal Decree 926/1998, or Art. 1(1) of Italian Law 130/1999, or Art. 1(1) 
of Portuguese Decree-Law 453/99.
40 The very purpose of securitization entities envisaged in the law is, on the one hand, to be exposed to risks as a result of the acquisition of receivables, or the conclusion of 
fi nancial instrument contracts (contrats constituant des instruments fi nanciers à terme); and, on the other hand, to procure the fi nancing of the risks by the issuance of securities 
or the conclusion of fi nancial instruments, or insurance contracts. See Arts L214-42-1 and L214-49-11 et seq. of the French Financial and Monetary Code.
41 See Art. R. 214-92 of the decretal part of the French Financial and Monetary Code.
42 See Art. R. 214-99 of the decretal part of the French Financial and Monetary Code.
43 See Art. R. 214-100 and R. 214-111 of the decretal part of the French Financial and Monetary Code.
44 According to the SEC AB Regulation, an asset-backed security is ‘a security that is primarily serviced by the cash fl ows of a discrete pool of receivables or other fi nancial assets, 
either fi xed or revolving, that by their terms convert into cash within a fi nite time period …’. See s. 229.1101 (Item 1101) (c) (1).
45 See Art. L 214-46-1 of the French Financial and Monetary Code, and Art. 18 of Portuguese Decree-Law 453/99. In addition to that, in countries like Italy, where the securitiza-
tion company holding the assets is an atypical fi nancial intermediary (case of Italy) there has been some debate as to the limit on the activities that the entity could undertake 
beyond the actual securitization. Some scholars have argued that those companies should be allowed to perform some advisory roles beyond the merely passive one of holding 
the assets. See Danillo Galletti, in Danillo Galletti, Gianluca Guerrieri & Andrea Carinci, Commentario alla Legge 30 Aprile 1999, n. 130. Disposizioni sulla Cartolarizzazione dei 
Crediti In Le Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate, no. 5 Settembre-Ottobre 2000 (Milano: CEDAM, 2000), 1062.
46 The American AB Regulation, for example, which focuses on the information that must be disclosed on the servicer, but not on who must perform the actual servicing func-
tion. See SEC, AB Regulation. Final Rule, 117.
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that role,47 but Western regulations leave the SPV out of those 
tasks, as they hold that, crucial as they are for the success of the 
transaction, they cannot yet be included as ‘securitization’ activities.
The case is different for some regulations in other coun-
tries, like India. India’s 2002 Securitization and Reconstruction 
Bill, under the umbrella of ‘securitization’, creates a whole new 
brand of operating companies (securitization/reconstruction 
 companies). The task of those companies is not only to receive 
the assets and sell securities to investors, but also to administer 
the deposit accounts necessary to have a proper cash manage-
ment48 (crucial to achieve asset segregation from the originator); 
and, what is more important, to service the receivables, by enforc-
ing them against debtors when necessary.49
With that context, it is legitimate to ask what is securitiza-
tion and of what does it consist. Does it involve a merely passive 
holding of a self-liquidating of pooled assets, as suggested by the 
American rules? Or it does include structures where the asset 
pool is actively administered by a specifi cally appointed manage-
ment company, as implied in most European regulations? Does it 
include the use of derivative and insurance contracts, as con-
templated by French law? Or in those cases the ‘derivative’ aspect 
weighs too much as to override the ‘securitization’ element, as 
implicit in the laws of most other countries? Is it limited to the 
‘legal’ administration of the assets, as most regulations seem to 
suggest? Or does it include the actual administration of the receiv-
ables (in the form of servicing activities) as Indian rules provide?
Further to that, we could even wonder whether the concept of 
securitization does depend upon the law or is beyond it. This appar-
ently theoretical question is relevant to assess whether a certain 
regulation is simply trying to establish certain requirements for a 
particular type of transaction, or whether it tries to go beyond that, 
and outlaw every transaction outside the description contemplated 
in the regulation. And, were it so, a concept of securitization would 
still be needed to determine what exactly is being outlawed. The 
question can also be relevant if a statute employs the word ‘securiti-
zation’ (a statute other than that pretending to delimit the activity). 
Should the reference be appraised in accordance with existing rules, 
or with regard to commercial practice? In either case, should that 
analysis be limited to a national, or a transnational level?
A comparative analysis thus shows that the most basic 
 definitional questions do not find a uniform answer across 
the legislative spectrum. And, in a system based on delimited 
 categories and definitions, it is hard to supervise an activity if we 
cannot define it satisfactorily.
3.2.2. Accounting Regulations and the Diffi culties with Defi ning the ‘SPV’
As far as the prior analysis shows, securitization constitutes a slip-
pery subject, hard to characterize by existing rules. Thus, following 
a logical order, we must now focus on the instrument employed by 
sponsors of securitization transactions to isolate the risks associated 
with the pooled assets: the SPV. These words, employed today as a 
term of art, describe an entity whose role is central (at least from a 
formal perspective) for the purposes of the deal. Thus, if no satisfac-
tory answer on ‘securitization’ is provided by existing rules, a good 
proxy could be to settle on a certain notion of ‘SPV’, or similar.
The task, alas, is as frustrating as searching for a definition 
of securitization, or even more. The field of law dealing more 
closely with the notion of SPVs is that of accounting regulation. 
SPVs came to be on the spot as a result of their fraudulent use 
in accounting-related scandals, like Enron’s.50 Enron used these 
‘puppet entities’ to keep risky assets and massive liabilities off 
its balance sheet: by thinly capitalizing them, a controlling stake 
could be given to a straw man, or a person in the orbit of Enron, 
and its CFO, Andrew Fastow.51 The entities, thus, were formally 
‘controlled’ by someone else, while Enron still retained the whole 
profits and risks of the transaction, cunningly disclosing the for-
mer, while concealing the latter.
With the outrage that ensued, regulators had to make sure that 
like scandals would not be repeated. Thus, accounting standards 
bodies (like the International Accounting Standards Board, or 
IASB, and the American Financial Accounting Standards Board, 
or FASB) set their views in promulgating specific rules for these 
‘puppet entities’.52 This new approach, however, could not work 
without a proper definition of the phenomenon that was to be 
regulated. And with that accounting rules have so far struggled. 
The rules issued by the IASB, rather than precisely defining what 
SPEs are, describe the different situations where they can be 
used, and the characteristics that accompany them, but without 
any aspiration of being exhaustive. SPEs, thus, are created to 
achieve a narrow and well-defined purpose, with strict limits in 
the powers of their management that cannot be modified.53 The 
rule, however, does not say how those factors must be appraised 
(whether all of them need to be present, or only some, how much 
 importance does each of them enjoy, etc.).
47 That is the case of Spanish, French or Portuguese regulations. See Art. 2(2)(b) para. 2 of the Spanish Royal Decree 926/1998; Art. L 214-46 of the French Financial and Mon-
etary Code; and Art. 5(2) of the Portuguese Decree-Law 453/99.
48 See s. 7(2) of the Indian Securitisation and Reconstruction Bill.
49 See s. 9 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction Bill.
50 See William Jr Powers, Chair Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp. February (2002) (hereafter Powers’ Report); 
Steven L. Schwarcz, ‘Securitization Post-Enron’, Cardozo Law Review 25 (2004): 1542–1543; Steven L. Schwarcz, ‘Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in 
Corporate Structures’, University of Cincinnati Law Review 70 (2002): 1309–1318.
51 See Powers’ Report, 47 et seq.; 68 et seq.; 79 et seq.; 99 et seq., etc.
52 See Standing Interpretations Committee (of the International Accounting Standards Board, or IASB) Interpretation SIC-12, Consolidation – Special Purpose Entities and the 
(American) Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Interpretation No. 46, Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities – An Interpretation of ARB No. 51 January 2003. 
This interpretation was revised in the same year, turning into Interpretation No. 46(R), Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities (revised December 2003) – an interpretation 
of ARB No. 51. We must note that SIC-12 was promulgated by the IASB in June 1998, earlier than Enron’s accounting scandals rose to the surface.
53 With the consequence that the entity operates in ‘autopilot’ mode. See Standing Interpretations Committee SIC-12, para. 1.
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The rules promulgated by the American FASB choose a com-
pletely different approach. Interpretation 46(R) coined the term 
‘Variable Interest Entity’ (VIE).54 By so doing, the regulator put an 
emphasis on all the elements that absorb the variability (primar-
ily losses) of the assets. That includes equity capital (traditionally 
employed as the single indicator of ‘control’ and consolidation) 
but also arrangements like guarantees or credit enhancement, 
which in case of SPVs take the hardest blow when losses material-
ize.55 Therefore, an entity will be deemed a VIE if either (fi rst) the 
total equity investment at risk in the entity does not permit the 
entity to fi nance its activities without subordinated fi nancial sup-
port;56 or (second) holders of equity lack any of the characteristics 
normally attached to a controlling fi nancial interest;57 or (third) 
voting rights do not correspond to gains and losses, or substan-
tially all of the entity’s activities involve or are conducted on behalf 
of an investor with disproportionately few voting rights.58
Together with the definition of VIE American accounting rules 
contemplated that of Qualifying Special Purpose Entity (QSPE).59 
In order to be a QSPE, the vehicle must have its activities signifi-
cantly limited in the inception documents, the assets held must be 
passive in nature, and the vehicle must be unable to sell or dispose 
of those assets.60 In essence, these rules are describing the vehicle 
of a ‘passive’ securitization,61 leaving out vehicles in revolving or 
dynamic structures.
Existing rules did not properly characterize the securitiza-
tion scenario. SPE and VIE rules were too wide; and they had to 
be, in order to include all relevant cases where ‘dummy’  entities 
are used. QSPE rules, on the other hand, were too narrow, and 
intended to provide preferential treatment to a specific case 
within securitization. New proposals have been released, which 
reform the wider definitions,62 while suppressing the narrower.63 
New definitions focus on the limitation of activities of the 
 vehicle,64 and the impossibility to assess ‘control’ in a conven-
tional way.65 Yet they risk leaving too broad a definition, which 
would be equally useless.
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR SUPERVISION
The first thing to establish for a sound system of regulation and 
supervision is to know what is being supervised, whom should 
be supervising, and how should it supervise. It is most disturbing 
that, in securitization, none of this is entirely clear.
The most serious source of uncertainty relates to the com-
petent authority to supervise. Depending how we characterize 
securitization, it should be subject to supervision by the authori-
ties supervising credit institutions, insurance undertakings, or 
securities firms and securities markets. For now, in countries with 
specific securitization regulations the task falls to the securities 
markets supervisor,66 or is shared between the latter and the cen-
tral bank.67 Yet for those cases where the vehicle may be exposed 
to insurance risks, supervision is entrusted (e.g., in France) to 
the insurance undertakings supervisor;68 while supervision of 
synthetic securitization by means of derivatives falls to the securi-
ties markets supervisor.69 It is disturbing that the law does not 
provide clear-cut rules to differentiate both cases.70
54 See Interpretation No. 46(R), Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities (revised December 2003) – an interpretation of ARB No. 51 paras 5 et seq.
55 See Interpretation No. 46(R) Appendix B (Variable Interests) para. B2.
56 The threshold is placed on 10% of the value of the assets. This does not exclude the possibility of demonstrating by means of qualitative or quantitative analysis that the 
entity can fi nance its activities without subordinated fi nancial support. See Interpretation No. 46(R), Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities (revised December 2003) – An 
interpretation of ARB No. 51 paras 9(a)–(c). 
57 That is, either they are unable to make economic decisions relevant for the entity by means of exercising their vote, or they are not obliged to suffer the entity’s losses  (guarantees) 
or to receive residual returns (caps on the returns). See Interpretation No. 46(R), Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities (revised December 2003) – An Interpretation of ARB No. 51 
para. 5(b).
58 Ibid., para. 5(c).
59 This term was not coined in the rules on consolidation, but the rules on asset transfer. See Financial Accounting Standard Board Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 140 
Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities (a replacement of FASB Statement No. 125) September 2000 paras 35 et seq. and 171 et 
seq. One of the requirements to account for an asset transfer is that the transferee has the unrestricted ability to sell or pledge the assets himself. In securitization cases, SPVs (who 
would be deemed the transferee) see their ability to operate with the assets greatly restricted. Thus, American accounting rules provided a sort of legal fi ction by which investors 
would be deemed the actual transferees. For that it was necessary that the vehicle did not count for the purposes of asset control; hence the requirements included in the rules.
60 See FAS 140, paras 35(b)–(d).
61 This with the intention of giving preferential treatment. When a QSPE is involved, not only the transfer counts as a sale for accounting purposes but the QSPE is  automatically 
excluded from consolidation in the originator’s balance sheet (whether or not it complies with general requirements contemplated in Interpretation 46(R)). See Interpretation 
No. 46(R) para. 4(c).
62 The American FASB has not proposed any amendment to the existing rules, while the IASB launched a new version of consolidation rules, with extensive reference to 
 ‘Structured Entities’, the new term that replaces the former ‘Special Purpose Entities’. See International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). Exposure Draft (ED) 10. Consoli-
dated Financial Statements. Comments to be received by 20 March 2009, December 2008. See also International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). Basis for Conclusions on 
Exposure Draft (ED) 10. Consolidated Financial Statements. Comments to be received by 20 March 2009, December 2008 and International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). 
Draft Illustrative Examples. ED 10 Consolidated Financial Statements. Comments to be received by 20 March 2009, December 2008.
63 The privileged treatment of QSPEs was put in question in the aftermath of the crisis, with the result that recent proposals for the modifi cation of US accounting rules contem-
plate its suppression. See FASB Financial Accounting Series. Exposure Draft (Revised) Proposed Statement of Financial Accounting Standards. Accounting for Transfers of Finan-
cial Assets. An amendment of FASB Statement No. 140, No. 1610-100, 15 Sep. 2008, para. 2(a). According to the explanatory part, the defi nition of QSPE had been overstretched, 
and employed in cases where the conditions were not met in substance. Ibid., para. A18.
64 IASB, Exposure Draft (ED) 10. Consolidated Financial Statements cit., para. 30.
65 IASB, Basis for Conclusions on Exposure Draft (ED) 10, para. B 106.
66 See, e.g., Art. 6(3) of Spanish Law 19/1992; Art. L214-49-1 para. 2, and Art. L214-49-7, para. 2 of the French Financial and Monetary Code.
67 See Art. 3(3) of Italian Law 130/1999, and Arts 106 et seq. of Italian General Banking Law.  
68 See Art. L214-49-13; and, more generally, sub-section 2 of section 2, Ch. IV, Book II of the French Financial and Monetary Code.
69 See Art. L214-49-1 para. 2 of the French Financial and Monetary Code.
70 Article R214-111 does not provide clear distinctions that distinguish credit derivatives from insurance contracts, leaving the matter quite open. Furthermore, other articles 
in the French Financial and Monetary Code (notably Art. L214-42-1, paras 1 and 2, or Art. L214-44) refer to securitization by means of fi nancial instruments (derivatives) or 
insurance contracts, implying that both can be used for the same purpose.
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Furthermore, even disregarding the trouble to select the 
competent authority to supervise the vehicle or its management 
company, the problems persist if we focus on the supervision of 
originating companies, where they are banks. Banking supervisors 
enforcing regulations based on the Basel Framework would need 
to rely on a definition of SPV, to determine whether the transac-
tion should be kept off-balance sheet. For that purpose, resort 
must be had to accounting rules, which, with a multiplicity of 
concepts (Special Purpose Entity, VIE, Qualified Special Purpose 
Entity, Structured Entity…) can create confusion. That confusion 
could be enhanced if the vehicle is an SPV (or SPE, VIE, QSPE, 
Società Europea (SE), etc.) under accounting rules and the Basel 
Framework, but the transaction accomplished does not qualify 
as securitization under national regulations (e.g., because it is a 
synthetic structure, which is not admitted under domestic rules). 
In that case, the relationship between banking supervisors and 
securities markets/insurance supervisors is unclear.
The right path to proceed would seem to be a division of 
competences based on the interests at stake. Enforcement of codes 
of conduct for investor protection purposes seems a task for 
supervisors of securities fi rms and markets: they should make sure 
that information is adequately disclosed; and that sponsors are 
suffi ciently checked, for example by ensuring that SPV manag-
ers and management companies are independent and act in the 
interest of investors. Banking and insurance supervisors should, 
on the other hand, make sure that risk is adequately accounted 
for, and that there is not a too high concentration of it threatening 
market stability. Lastly, banking supervisors should be aware of 
the compliance with adequate originating practices, and make sure 
that credit institutions comply with quality standards for credit 
underwriting.
And still, the answer may yet not be that simple. In cases 
where the underwritten credit is of poor quality, this will be 
an issue for supervision at the origination level. Yet bad loans, 
when securitized, will certainly raise issues concerning investor 
protection (e.g., statements in the offering documents as to the 
quality of underlying assets may be deemed false; mechanisms to 
put a check on the originator may be insufficient, etc.) thereby 
prompting the supervisor of securities firms and markets to 
intervene. Finally, an excessive accumulation of positions on bad 
loans will increase the probability of the originating bank having 
to absorb the assets as a matter of reputation; which will be proof 
that the risks were not properly accounted for in the first place, 
something that will be for the banking supervisor to decide. This 
may even threaten the stability of institutional investors who 
have subscribed derivative or insurance contracts, which will be a 
matter shared between the insurance and the banking supervisor.
The dire picture outlined above becomes more gruesome if 
we extrapolate it to the cross-border context. There the prob-
lems described will be aggravated by the inconsistencies between 
domestic rules, the uncertainty as to the applicable law, and the 
possible turf wars between national supervisory authorities.
5.  CONCLUSIONS: WHAT SECURITIZATION TELLS US ABOUT THE 
EXISTING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
A Comparative analysis of existing regulation; of general rules 
on financial intermediaries, as well as specific provisions on 
securitization shows quite startling results. Across the interna-
tional regulatory spectrum no consensus has emerged as to what 
securitization really is or consists of. Equally important, there is 
no clear guidance as to what type of regulated financial activity 
securitization resembles the most. This creates obvious problems 
for assigning the responsibility of surveillance. If that is the con-
text, it is hard to bring securitization back from the edges of the 
regulatory web into the realm of legal certainty.
The analysis, however, is also important for what it teaches 
about the existing regulatory framework of fi nancial intermedia-
tion. Securitization does not fi t properly because it is a by-product 
of modern fi nancial innovation, estranged from the inner concep-
tions that gave rise to the current regulatory system. Yet this alien-
ation is very present in modern fi nancial practice, where complex 
transactions often mingle products like loans, insurance and deriv-
atives; and fi rms engage in providing such complex services, while 
mixing them with extensive advice on all kinds of products and 
transactions (the 2007–2008 fi nancial crisis is a coarse example 
of this multi-functionality of fi nancial fi rms, with the consequent 
diffi culty to isolate risks). This leads to a deeper refl ection on the 
need to change the foundations of existing fi nancial regulation.
When the current framework was envisaged, regulators did 
not create immutable categories, belonging to the World of Ideas 
of Plato, or the Ihering’s Heaven of Concepts, where everything 
exists in its essence. Rather, they were good observers of the eco-
nomic and financial reality of their time, and captured it, while 
making sure that existing activities evolved within the boundaries 
of prudence and reasonableness. Thus, traditional regulations 
were divided into rules on credit institutions, investment firms, 
insurance companies and collective investment undertakings 
because that covered the scope of financial activity at that time, 
and firms would not venture beyond their own turf.
Consequently, financial regulation’s trouble to tackle securiti-
zation’s problems is but the tip of a great iceberg; for the question 
resounding across policy shops should not be in what category 
does securitization fit, but whether such categories make sense at 
all. A famous quote from George Bernard Shaw says that ‘Crude 
classifications and false generalizations are the curse of organized 
life’. While it is hard to think of a more ‘organized life’ than that 
described in financial regulations, it is now the responsibility 
of legislatures and policy-makers to make classifications more 
refined, and generalizations more harmonious.
